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THEORY AND PRACTICE:
THE CASE OF THE NAVAJO-HOPI LAND DISPUTE
E RIC CHEYFITZ

*

In 1997, through a series of circumstances connected to my
research in Native American studies, I began what has turned out to
be an ongoing relationship with a part of the Navajo community of
Big Mountain in northeastern Arizona. I would describe my
relationship with this community as a classic trading relationship,
modeled on the collaboration implied in the extended kinship
relations of American Indian communities, through which resources
1
are shared and webs of support woven. The resources I have brought
to this community and was in the first instance invited to bring are
the interpretive skills, including a commitment to critical theory, that
inform this paper, part of which derives from a history of the NavajoHopi Land Dispute that I wrote to be used as a tool in community
organizing at the request of the Big Mountain community with whom
I trade. These are the same resources I have used to interpret legal
documents, write petitions and proposals for this community. In
exchange for my work, the community at Big Mountain has given me
an invaluable education, oral and written, in the Land Dispute and,
more broadly, in the theory and practice of Navajo lifeways, which in
turn has grounded my theory of the Dispute in the historical day-today practices of the Navajo and Hopi communities impacted by the
*

PhD, John Hopkins University. Eric Cheyfitz is Clara M. Clendenen Term
Professor of English at the University of Pennsylvania and an adjunct professor in the
Law School, where he teaches federal Indian law. In addition to scholarly
publication, his work in Indian law includes ongoing consulting with Native
communities in the Southwest and the Midwest. He is currently at work on The
Columbia History of Native American Literatures of the United States, 1945-2000, of which
he is the editor.
1. See GARRICK BAILEY & ROBERTA G. BAILEY, A H ISTORY OF THE N AVAJOS  T HE
RESERVATION Y EARS 16 (1986) (noting that the Pueblo refugees who joined the
Navajos brought with them their knowledge of sheep and goat herding).
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Dispute itself.
In this way practice has certainly informed theory, although I might
note here that it was initially theory (a certain theory I was pursuing
about cultural collaborations) that led to practice. But in this essay,
more specifically, I want to suggest the way theory might revolutionize
the paradigms that operate so destructively in the legal construction
of what 18 U.S.C. § 1151 defines as  Indian country, which includes:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the
jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the
issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running
through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities
within the borders of the United States whether within the original
or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or
without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the
Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights2
of-way running through the same.

The Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute is typical of the way that a certain
kind of translation has governed U.S./ Indian relations historically,
since federal Indian law began to take shape at the end of the
eighteenth century. Three early nineteenth-century Supreme Court
cases in particular Johnson v. McIntosh,3 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,4
5
and Worcester v. Georgia  provided a still-current legal vocabulary for
a colonial structure, which the federal government began to
elaborate administratively in 1824 with the creation of the Bureau of
6
Indian Affairs (BIA). This vocabulary translated typically
decentralized Native societies, based on extended kinship relations to
communal lands, into the Western terms of  nation and  property,
not so that Indian communities could be acknowledged as fully
sovereign states with legal title to their lands; but so that Indian tribal
sovereignty and title could  legally come under the  plenary power
of Congress, which is where it rests today in the lower forty-eight
states.7 As far as land rights are concerned, Alaskan Natives come
2.
3.
4.
5.

18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2001).
21 U.S. 543 (1823).
30 U.S. 1 (1831).
31 U.S. 515 (1832).
6. See Kevin Gover, Remarks at the Ceremony Acknowledging the 175th Anniversary of
the Establishment of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 25 A M. INDIAN L. REV. 161 (2001)
(noting that in March of 1824, President James Monroe established the Office of
Indian Affairs in the Department of War and that its mission was to conduct the
nations business with regard to Indian affairs).
7. See id. (stating that the Office of Indian Affairs was an instrument by which
the United States enforced its ambition against the Indian Nations and Indian
people who stood in its path).
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under a different agenda codified in the Alaskan Native Claims
8
9
Settlement Act of 1971. The Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, which
made all United States Indians citizens by fiat, in no way affects the
colonial status of federally recognized Indian tribes, but only
contradicts it by presenting us with the legal paradox of sovereign
citizens who are at the same time colonial subjects if they choose to
reside in  the domestic dependent nations that comprise  Indian
10
country. I emphasize  choose here to mark it as overdetermined
in any context. In the context of Indian country, this choice of
residence is a complex set of cultural, social, economic, and political
factors represented in the gravity exerted by the nexus of kinship,
community, and land. Of the approximately two million censusidentified Indians living in the United States, 1,698,483 are tribally
enrolled; and of those 1,397,931 choose to live on or near
reservations in the lower forty-eight states or Alaskan Native villages.11
In contradistinction to the narrative of Navajo-Hopi relations that
girds the legal cases and has been promulgated by the Hopi Tribal
Council since the 1960s  a narrative of Hopi historical priority in
the Southwest, Navajo aggression, and consequent historic enmity
12
between the two tribes based in absolute cultural contrasts  both
Navajo and Hopi traditional narratives tell us that that these two
peoples emerged from the earth into what is the present-day
Southwest at the same moment. In at least one version of the Navajo
13
creation narrative, Diné bahanè (story of the people), the Navajo and
14
Pueblo peoples meet each other in the fourth of five worlds. There
the Pueblo people (Kiisáanii) take the Navajos in as kin and give
15
them seeds with which they begin their own agriculture. There are
8. 43 U.S.C. § 1601 (1994).
9. Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §

1401(b) (1994)).
10. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. 1 at 17 (noting that Indians may be denominated
subjects of domestic dependent nation because they occupy a territory to which the
United States government has title independent of their will, in effect the Indians
relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to a guardian).
11. BUREAU OF INDIAN A FFAIRS, INDIAN L ABOR F ORCE REPORT i (1999).
12. See Healing v. Jones, 210 F. Supp. 125, 134-35 (D. Ariz. 1962) (noting that the
Navajos entered what is now Arizona in the last half of the eighteenth century and
that the Hopis occupied the area between the Navajo Mountain and the Little
Colorado River and between the San Francisco Mountains and the Luckachukas).
13. PAUL G. Z OLBROD, DINÈ BAHANÈ  T HE N AVAJO CREATION STORY (1984).
14. See id. at 46 (stating that the Navajo are invited to the Pueblos village in the
fourth world).
15. See id. at 54 (noting that from the Pueblo, the Navajos received seeds and so
they flourished as people who farmed the earth).
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periods of strife as well. However, what the narrative suggests is that
the Navajo and Pueblo peoples, including the Hopis, have a long
history of trade and intermarriage, as well as intermittent conflict on
a small scale, but that these peoples have all lived together and
shared the land from their beginnings and to this day retain
traditions of such sharing. After the Pueblo Revolt of 1680, when the
Spanish returned to invade and reconquer the Southwest between
1692-96, many Pueblo people moved west and took up residence with
17
both the Navajos and the Hopis. Reflecting a historic comity in
Navajo/Hopi relations, author Clyde Kluckhohn notes:  In the late
eighteenth century when the Hopi towns were beset by famine and
plague, fairly large numbers of Hopi migrated to Canyon de Chelly
and del Muerto and amalgamated with the Navajo then living
18
there . Looking at the cultures of Navajo and Pueblo peoples, there
are many similarities in narratives, ceremonies, and social and
19
economic life.
There was no Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute before the United States
took the Southwest from Mexico in the Mexican War, which occurred
20
between 1846 and 1848. United States settlers began invading the
region, taking land and thereby putting increasing pressure on the
21
22
Navajos, whose population and sheep herds were growing rapidly.
In his book entitled GEOPOLITICS OF THE N AVAJO-H OPI L AND
23
DISPUTE , John Redhouse remarks:  Steady encroachment by white
settlers forced many Navajos to move closer to the Hopi villages and
into their customary use area. This in turn caused minor disputes
16. See id. at 53 (remarking that the descendants of the First Man and the First
Woman put one of their nonchildbearing individuals in charge of the dam for fear
that the Pueblo might destroy their dam or injure their crops).
17. See BAILEY & BAILEY, supra note 1, at 14-15 (noting that thousands of Pueblo
Indians fled their villages along the Rio Grande, some joined the Hopis, but most
took refuge with the Athabaskans living in the Dinetah region along the upper San
Juan River).
18. CLYDE KLUKHOHN , N AVAJO WITCHCRAFT 74 (1967).
19. See BAILEY & BAILEY, supra note 1, at 14 (describing the fact that Pueblo
refugees who fled during the Spanish reconquest of New Mexico brought with them
Puebloan ideas and technology and that Navajos not only learned about Pueblo
technology, but also absorbed Pueblo religious and social concepts and procedures).
20. See id. at 18 (stating that prior to 1846, the Navajos and the  Mexican
populations were constantly fighting, and in 1846,  the United States government
inherited this war when it seized control of New Mexico ).
21. See id. at 74-77 (illustrating the encroachment upon the Navajos by AngloAmericans).
22. See id. at 19-21 (noting that the Navajo population increased by
approximately 10,000 between the years of 1846-1860, in addition to an average
increase of 300,000 sheep).
23. JOHN REDHOUSE , GEOPOLITICS OF THE N AVAJO-H OPI L AND DISPUTE 4 (1985).
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between Hopi farmers and Navajo ranchers over scarce water supplies
24
and land resources. At the same time, the United States was in the
process of bringing Indian lands under the governance of federal
Indian law through the administration of the Bureau of Indian
25
Affairs (BIA). Under this law, the federal government holds title to
virtually all Indian land in the lower forty-eight states, most of which
26
the government converted to reservations or trust allotments.
The Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute began on December 16, 1882,
when at the request of the Secretary of the Interior, H.M. Teller,
27
President Chester Arthur by executive order created a reservation.
This reservation enclosed 2.5 million acres, or 3,900 square miles,
surrounding the three mesas on which all but two of the present-day
28
twelve Hopi villages are located. This reservation encompassed the
29
entire Hopi population.
The Secretary himself was responding to a complaint from the
federal agent at Hopi, J.H. Fleming, who had asked the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Hiram Price, to evict two Anglos
from Hopi because they were aiding Hopi families in resisting federal
30
attempts to send their children to boarding schools. Price informed
Fleming that the government had no power to evict anyone from
31
what was then designated as  public land under United States law.
Therefore, Fleming asked that the public land in question be
designated a reservation because once it became federal land he

24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 4.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994).
Id.
See Healing v. Jones, 210 F. Supp. 125, 129 n.1 (D. Ariz. 1962) (citing the
Executive Order of Dec. 16, 1882); REDHOUSE, supra note 23, at 5.
28. See REDHOUSE , supra note 23, at 5 ( Obsessed with geometry, bureaucrat
Fleming mailed in his order  a perfect rectangular reservation, one degree latitude,
one degree longitude, 70 miles by 55, and encompassing approximately 2.5 million
acres or 3900 square miles of former Arizona territory. ).
29. See Healing, 210 F. Supp. at 137 (noting that at the time of the executive
order, there were 1,800 Hopis and approximately 300 Navajos living on the land); see
also REDHOUSE, supra note 23, at 5 (stating that there were also 300-600 Navajos living
within these boundaries).
30. See REDHOUSE , supra note 23, at 5 (explaining that the BIA imposed a
 compulsory education program for Hopi children which Hopi parents resisted.
Therefore, the Hopis had elicited the help of two Anglos in fighting the BIA from
taking their children away).
31. See id. ( Indian agent in charge J.H. Fleming then tried to arrest the pair
[two white men] but was told that he lacked the proper authority to do so because
the Hopi villages technically did not constitute a federal Indian reservation and
therefore he did not have jurisdiction over them. ).
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would have the power to evict the Anglos.
As a result, the 1882 Reservation was not primarily created because
of a conflict between Navajos and Hopis, but because of a conflict
between the federal government and Hopi families who were
resisting having their children taken from them and to be sent away
33
to boarding schools. The fact that the federal government did not
disturb the three to six hundred Navajos who found themselves living
along with the Hopis within the reservations boarders serves to
emphasize this fact. Indeed, the language of the executive order
stated that the reservation was not only for the Hopis but also  for
such other Indians as the Secretary of the Interior may see fit to settle
34
thereon.
In 1962, a federal court would find that those  other
Indians were the Navajos and their descendants whose traditional
35
lands had been enclosed by the 1882 Reservation.
Between 1882 and 1958, there were no legal or legislative directives
involving the 1882 Reservation. During these years, all the changes
on the reservation were brought about by administrative rulings
within the Department of the Interior, in response, at least in part, to
36
population growth. By 1958, there were an estimated 8,800 Navajos
37
and in excess of 3,200 Hopis living on the 1882 Reservation. During
32. Id.; see also Healing, 210 F. Supp. at 136 (noting that Fleming urged the
Secretary of the Interior to create a Hopi reservation so that the Hopis would be
protected from white men, other tribes, and the Mormons).
33. See Eric Cheyfitz, Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute  A Brief History, 2 INTERVENTIONS
247 (2000), stating:
In a letter of 4 December 1882 to Hiram Price, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
Fleming does write of the pressures on the Hopis presented by both Mormon settlers
and Navajos, which, he insists, a reservation will help to relieve. But he does not
mention the primary pressure from Anglo ranchers on the Navajos that were forcing
them and the Hopis into narrowing spaces with diminished resources. It is, however,
clear from his correspondence to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs beginning in
February of 1882, when he arrived at the Hopi Agency in Keams Canyon (about 12
miles east of First Mesa), and his annual report to the Commissioner, dated 31 August
1882, that the primary force he is trying to combat is Hopi resistance to
Christianization. In fact, he does not mention Navajos at all in this report except to
point out that by far more of the Hopis understand Navajo than they do either
Spanish or English, a circumstance that points to the long intertwined history of these
two communities, to which I have alluded.
34. See Healing v. Jones, 210 F. Supp. 125, 138 (D. Ariz. 1962).
35. See id. at 144-45 (finding that this determination can be made through a twopart test: 1) whether  Indians used and occupied the reservation, in Indian fashion,
as their continuing and permanent area of residence; and 2) whether the
undertaking of such use . . . if undertaken without advance permission, was
authorized by the Secretary, exercising the discretion vested in him . . . ).
36. See REDHOUSE , supra note 23, at 6 (explaining that these administrative
rulings included an expansion of tribal lands in order to accommodate the  flow of
Navajo refugees ).
37. See Healing, 210 F. Supp. at 168-69 (recognizing the population growth that
occurred on the 1882 reservation).
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this period, the federal government was at work segregating Navajos
and Hopis on the 1882 Reservation, an agenda that along with
population pressures could only have helped polarize two groups of
38
people who had traditionally shared the land. In the mid-1930s, the
BIA created grazing District 6, the approximately 650,000 acres
39
including and immediately surrounding the Hopi mesas.
Additionally, the BIA forbade Hopi grazing or living beyond this area
40
Concurrently, Congress
without the issuance of permits.
41
consolidated the 25,000 square miles of the Navajo reservation,
which by then completely enclosed the 1882 Reservation and created
Hopi fears about being overwhelmed by the Navajo presence.
It was during this time, between 1882 and 1958, that a Navajo-Hopi
land dispute was in the making42 but it is important to emphasize that
it was not initially the Navajos and the Hopis who instigated this
dispute but the federal government through the manipulation of
43
traditional Navajo and Hopi lands.
In the 1950s, the Navajo and Hopi tribal councils, under the
direction of two Anglo lawyers, John Boyden for the Hopis and
Norman Littell for the Navajos, who were approved by the Interior
Department as was and is customary, began to develop a legal agenda
to decide which tribe held both the surface and subsurface (mineral)
44
rights to the 1882 Reservation. Both tribes, under a 1946 ruling by
38. See id. at 171 (noting that the segregation policy meant that Navajos were not
 to use and occupy that part of the reservation in which the Hopi population was
concentrated ).
39. See id. at 158 (describing how this area was specifically created to
 encompass the area where the Hopis resided).
40. See Healing v. Jones, 210 F. Supp. 125, 161-65 (D. Ariz. 1962) (finding that
these permits were difficult to obtain since the Navajos has exclusive use of the lands
outside of District 6).
41. See Masayesva v. Zah, 792 F. Supp. 1172, 1177 (D. Ariz. 1992) (noting that the
purpose of the 1934 Act was to consolidate the boundaries of the Navajo
Reservation); see also Healing, 210 F. Supp. at 159 n.40 (explaining that the entire
Hopi and Navajo Reservation should be viewed as  one super land management
district ).
42. See Healing, 210 F. Supp. at 158-69 (describing the evolution of the NavajoHopi land dispute).
43. See id. at 158-63 (reiterating the means by which the Office of Indian Affairs
attempted to divide the lands between the Hopis and Navajos, thereby creating
friction between the two tribes).
44. Boyden filed a petition arguing that  the claim of exclusive Hopi mineral
ownership of the 1882 reservation should be decided separately from the issue of
Navajo grazing rights to the same area. Littell answered by contending that the
Navajos had historically  used and occupied most of the surface of the executive
order reservation, and therefore they were entitled to the mineral rights. See
REDHOUSE, supra note 23, at 10.
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the Interior Department, shared the subsurface mineral rights. To
implement this legal agenda, Congress passed the Act of July 22, 1958
that waived the sovereign immunity of both tribes so that they could
sue one another in federal court in order to determine rights to the
46
Prior to the passage of the Act, Littell had
1882 Reservation.
forwarded two resolutions to the Navajo Nation Tribal Council, which
it approved, recommending that Congress loan the Hopis money to
47
pursue the suit by leasing the mineral rights to the 1882 Reservation.
48
However, Congress rejected these resolutions.
49
Passage of the Act of July 22, 1958, resulted in Healing v. Jones, a
50
lawsuit named after the two tribal chairman at the time. The federal
51
district court in Arizona decided the suit in 1962 and the Supreme
52
Court affirmed this decision  without comment in June 1963. The
decision created grazing District 6 as the official Hopi reservation,
and designated the remaining 1.85 million acres of the 1882
Reservation as the Joint Use Area ( JUA ), to be shared by the
53
Navajos and Hopis who lived there. However, the JUA was used
almost exclusively by the Navajos because customary living patterns
resulted in most of the Hopis remaining relatively close to the three
mesas. The decision, however, did not change the 1946 Department
54
55
of the Interior ruling on shared subsurface rights. This
45. See id. at 9 ( The rights of the Navajos within the area who settled in good
faith prior to 1936 are co-extensive with those of the Hopis with respect to the natural
resources of the reservation. ); see also Healing, 210 F. Supp. at 167; Cheyfitz, supra
note 33, at 261.
46. Act of July 22, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-547, 72 Stat. 403 (1958).
47. See REDHOUSE , supra note 23, at 11 (remarking that Littells actions in
drafting these two resolutions were highly suspect since he had provided in his
contract with the Navajos that he would receive ten percent of the  contested surface
and mineral estate of the reservation ).
48. See id. (noting that after rejecting the two resolutions, Congress enacted the
Act of July 22, 1958, which determined the interests of the Hopis and Navajos to the
mineral rights).
49. 210 F. Supp. 125 (D. Ariz. 1962).
50. See id. Dewey Healing was the tribal chairman for the Hopis, while Paul Jones
was the tribal chairman for the Navajos. Id.
51. See id. (finding that,  subject to the trust title of the United States, a part of the

reservation was the exclusive interest of the Hopi Indian Tribe, and that the remaining
contested part was to be held by the Hopi Indian Tribe and the Navajo Indian Tribe, jointly,
undivided and in equal interests. ).

Id.
52. 373 U.S. 758 (1963).
53. See Healing v. Jones, 210 F. Supp. 125, 191-92 (D. Ariz. 1962) (concluding

that the Hopi tribe has exclusive interest in grazing district 6, and that the remaining
land in dispute was to be jointly-held).
54. See 59 U.S. DEPT OF THE INTERIOR, OWNERSHIP OF THE MINERAL E STATE IN THE
H OPI E XECUTIVE ORDER RESERVATION 248 (1946) (finding that the Hopis and Navajos
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collaboration, not to say collusion, between Navajo and Hopi tribal
councils at the instigation of lawyers representing mineral interests,
who were operating under the auspices of the federal government,
drove the succeeding stages of the Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute. The
collaboration showed no regard for the people, Navajos and Hopis,
living on the 1882 Reservation; in its next stage, beginning in the
mid-1970s, it would prove to be disastrous for the approximately
15,000-17,000 Navajos who were living there. Years later, it was
proven that John Boyden, the lawyer for the Hopi Tribe, also
56
represented Peabody Coal a clear conflict of interest.
From the time Healing was decided, the Hopi tribal council, with
Boyden representing them, lobbied Congress for the partitioning of
the JUA between the Hopis and the Navajos. The Hopi tribal council
claimed that Navajo use of the area was subverting Hopi use, even
though then, as now, there does not appear to have been much, if
57
The lobbying effort resulted in the
any, Hopi use of this land.
passage of the Navajo and Hopi Indian Land Settlement Act by
58
Congress in December, 1974. This Act mandated that the two tribes
negotiate for the partition of the JUA, and that if the negotiations
failed, the federal district court in Arizona would draw the partition
59
line. Predictably, because of the polarizing effects of governmental
intervention over the years, the negotiations failed, and the court
ordered the partition of the land. Partitioning of the JUA began in
who entered the reservation area prior to Oct. 24, 1936 had rights to the land).
55. See id. (finding that the Hopi and Navajo tribes have joint interests in the
surface and subsurface mineral rights).
56. See INDIAN L AW RESOURCE CENTER, REPORT TO THE HOPI KIKMONGWIS AND
OTHER T RADITIONAL H OPI L EADERS ON DOCKET 196 AND THE CONTINUING T HREAT TO
H OPI L AND AND SOVEREIGNTY 150-55 (1979) (setting forth the allegations and the
circumstances surrounding them that Boyden had a conflict of interest through
representation of Peabody Coal and the Hopi Tribe during the same time period);
see also Charles F. Wilkinson, Home Dance, the Hopi, and Black Mesa Coal: Conquest and
Endurance in the American Southwest, 1996 BYU L. REV. 449, 469 (remarking that while
Boyden denied representing Peabody Coal, files released to the University of Utah
after his death provide evidence of this representation through the mid-1960s while
he was representing the Hopi).
57. See Cheyfitz, supra note 33 at 263-64 (commenting that, for the most part,
Hopis had not settled within the JUA and observing that very few Hopi families and
cattle were located in the area during the authors visits to the area between 1997
and 1999).
58. See Navajo & Hopi Indian Land Settlement Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-531,
88 Stat. 1712 (1974) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 640(d)(1)-(32) (2001))
(providing for the final settlement of the conflicting interests of the tribes in the
JUA).
59. See id. § 4(A) (stating that if an agreement is not reached, the mediator will
submit a report to the court of his recommendations, and the district court is
permitted to make a final adjudication, including partition of the JUA).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2002

9

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 5
CHEYFITZ_FINAL2

628

7/17/02 4:55 PM

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE L AW [Vol. 10:3

February 1977, creating the Hopi Partitioned Lands ( HPL ) and the
Navajo Partitioned Lands ( NPL ).
While 100 Hopis found
themselves on the Navajo side of the line and thus were forced to
relocate by the court, approximately 15,000-17,000 Navajos found
60
themselves on the Hopi side.
The court ordered Navajos found on the HPL side to be relocated
by the BIA, first to towns bordering the Navajo reservation, and
subsequently to lands bordering the reservation to the south the socalled  New Lands. The New Lands were added to the reservation
in order to accommodate relocating Navajos, but they are far away
from the Navajo homelands on the 1882 Reservation.
The
dislocation of these Navajos from their traditional land resulted in
massive social damage, the fracturing of extended family life with its
network of social and economic supports, and a resultant increase in
 depression, violence, illness, and substance abuse. 61 Relocation was
opposed not only by Navajo resistors living on the HPL, but also by
traditional Hopi leaders (Kikmongwis), who viewed the collaboration
between the Hopi tribal council and the United States government,
under pressure from mineral interests, as a violation of traditional
62
Hopi ways. This collaboration between traditional Hopi leaders and
HPL Navajos is another instance that belies the oppositional title
 Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute.
In 1988, in response to the relocation mandate, a group of Navajos
living on the HPL brought suit in the federal district court in Arizona
63
One argument advanced by the HPL
to remain on the land.
64
Navajos was violation of their First Amendment religious rights. The
60. See H OPI T RIBE , H OPI COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOPMENT PLAN 45 (1988)
(suggesting that new energy resource exploration and mining could occur on the
lands once the Tribe has adopted a new energy resource development policy).
Professor Cheyfitz argues that resource exploration and mining operations would
undermine the lives of Navajos living within the HPL by placing them in the middle
of conflicts over the use of the land. See Cheyfitz, supra note 33, at 256 (predicting
conflicts will arise between use of the land for mineral extraction or for grazing and
agricultural purposes).
61. E MILY BENEDEK, T HE WIND WON T KNOW ME : A H ISTORY OF THE N AVAJO-H OPI
L AND DISPUTE 175 (1999).
62. See INDIAN L AW RESOURCE CENTER, supra note 56, at 172-74 (referring to a
letter from the traditional Hopi leaders to Congressman Sam Steiger, voicing their
opposition to the bill and hoping that they would be allowed to work out an
agreement with the Navajos without passage of the Settlement Act of 1974).
63. Manybeads v. United States, 730 F. Supp. 1515 (D. Ariz. 1989).
64. See id. at 1517 (stating that the first argument of the HPL Navajos challenging
the constitutionality of the Navajo-Hopi Land Settlement Act of 1974 is that the Act is
a violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment). The First
Amendment states  Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . . See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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65

suit was dismissed.
By that time perhaps 3,000 Navajos of the
original 15,000-17,000 remained on the HPL. In 1991, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, in lieu of hearing an appeal of the
66
Manybeads case, ordered all the groups involved into mediation in
an attempt to resolve the dispute. The result of this mediation was
67
the Navajo-Hopi Land Settlement Act of 1996, which included an
Accommodation Agreement ( AA ).
The 1996 Act provided HPL Navajos who wished to remain on the
HPL the option of signing the AA, which is a lease agreement,
guaranteed by the United States. The lease would be between the
68
This
HPL Navajos, the Navajo Nation, and the Hopi Tribe.
Agreement permits the HPL Navajos to remain on their land for
seventy-five years, after which time any one of the parties to the AA
69
can discontinue it.
Thus, the Hopis have retained the right to
eventually evict all Navajos from the HPL, if they so choose. The AA
translates traditional, common land into Hopi rental property,
actually owned under federal Indian law by the United States. The
colonial machinations are stupefying. Navajos who refuse to sign the
AA, and some have refused in active resistance to the federal process
70
of translation, face eviction. So far, no eviction proceedings have
been instituted. Furthermore, major legal initiatives attempting to
reverse the Settlement Acts of 1974 and 1996 appear to have come to
an end in April 2000, with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
71
affirmation of the district courts dismissal of the Manybeads case.
The AA places HPL Navajos under both Hopi and Navajo
72
jurisdiction. While HPL Navajos are members of the Navajo Nation,
they also come under Hopi jurisdiction in both criminal and civil
matters relating to residency on the HPL, while remaining under
65. See Manybeads, 730 F. Supp. at 1521-22 (finding that the HPL Navajos did not
establish a likelihood of success on the merits and that serious questions of hardship
were not raised, resulting in a dismissal of the suit).
66. See id. The groups involved in the dispute were the HPL Navajos, the Navajo
Nation, the Hopi Tribe, and the United States. Id.
67. See Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute Settlement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-301,
110 Stat. 3649 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 640(d)(1)-(32) (2001)).
68. See id. § 2(3) (stating that the Act, the Settlement Agreement and the
Accommodation Agreement provide the Hopis authority to enter into agreements
with eligible Navajo families so that they can remain on the HPL).
69. Id.
70. See Cheyfitz, supra note 33, at 253 (explaining that eviction could occur for
Navajos who have refused to sign an Accommodation Agreement).
71. See Manybeads v. United States, 209 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2000).
72. See S. REP. N O. 104-363, at 51-52 (1996) (reprinting the Accommodation
Agreement).
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Navajo jurisdiction in other civil matters, particularly in the domestic
73
sphere. Because of the history of the Land Dispute, HPL Navajos
have a whole set of issues relating to the terms and enforcement of
the AA that are unique to their situation, including the crucial
74
matters of grazing and religious rights. Nevertheless, these Navajos
have no representation on the Hopi tribal council, and their only
representation on the Navajo tribal council is through the separate
chapters bordering the HPL, where they are represented not as a
75
group but as separate persons. A chapter is roughly equivalent to a
congressional district, whose residents elect representatives to the
tribal council. Dispersed over the 1.85 million acres of the HPL, the
76
HPL Navajos are necessarily members of different chapters. Thus,
these Navajos have no representation as a distinct group with a set of
77
special interests. Due to the history of the 1882 Reservation, it is
78
clear that they need such representation. The most effective way to
achieve this would be as a separate HPL chapter represented on the
Navajo Nation Council, where the HPL Navajos could present their
79
agenda as a community to the Nation. The Navajo Nation, as a
party to the provisions of the 1996 Act, which includes the AA, is the
proper representative of this group before the Hopi Tribe. Without
such representation, the HPL Navajos are effectively without a
political voice in an arena where their vital interests are at stake. HPL
community organizers are at present seeking to achieve such
representation.
In the broad historical overview of federal Indian policy that
includes the Indian Removal Act of 1831, which set the stage for the
catastrophic removal of the Creeks, Choctaws, Chickasaws, Seminoles,
and Cherokees from their homes in the southeast to what is present
day Oklahoma; the Dawes Act of 1887, which resulted in the taking of
73. See id.
74. See Cheyfitz, supra note 33, at 263. Both the Hopi and Navajo use the land for
wood-cutting, ceremonial purposes, and cultivation of products for medicinal
purposes. However, the Navajo have a significant grazing presence on the HPL,
whereas the Hopis do not. Id.
75. See id. at 257 (explaining that under the terms of the agreement, HPL
Navajos have very little representation as a group and input with respect to the
renewal of the agreement).
76. See Healing v. Jones, 210 F. Supp. 125, 191-92 (D. Ariz. 1962) (creating the
Joint Use Area where the HPL Navajos reside).
77. See Cheyfitz, supra note 33, at 257 (noting that despite the lack of group
representation, the Navajo are a distinct group with special interests).
78. See Cheyfitz, supra note 33, at 271 (noting the need for more adequate
representation).
79. See Cheyfitz, supra note 33, at 271 (maintaining that a community
organization would address local needs and facilitate the collaborative process).
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93,000,000 acres of Native land through the shattering of Indian
communities in an attempt to force their inhabitants to emulate the
paradigm of the American property holder; and the policy of
Termination and Relocation of the 1950s and 1960s, which once
again attacked Indian communalism through the closing down of
reservations and the creation of a dislocated, impoverished urban
Indian population, the public policy of Navajo-Hopi removal, which
has fallen overwhelmingly on the Navajos, is part of an ongoing
colonial war against the Indians fought now in legal and legislative
80
battles.
It is important to emphasize that applying the case-law paradigm of
agonistic interaction in this dispute is not in the publics interest.
Whatever its stated motives, since 1974 and the relocation mandate,
the U.S. public, through Congress, has spent approximately 400
million dollars in what has amounted to an attempt, whatever the
stated motives, to destroy a particular Indian community, one,
moreover, that is a particularly vital repository of the theory and
practice of traditional Navajo lifeways. Nor have the Hopi people,
largely impoverished themselves like the rest of Indian country,
81
benefited from the Dispute. Albert Yava, a Hopi-Tewa, wrote in his
book Big Falling Snow:  The well-off Hopi has special interests. If he
owns a lot of cattle for example, that land we have been contesting
with the Navajos is much more important to him than to a poor
family in Shipaulovi [one of the Hopi villages]. The average Hopi
82
isnt going to benefit very much from the land settlement.
As an alternative to the case law paradigm and the distorted history
of Navajo-Hopi relations it has constructed, a theory of collaboration in
the full range of the terms meaning from coercion to co-operation,
might help us construct an altogether different paradigm than the
adversarial and ultimately destructive one that federal Indian law has
imposed. The primary force of this different paradigm, through
which one understands the complex collaborations the Dispute has
historically imposed, is to deconstruct the reductive opposition
Navajo/Hopi that has driven the Dispute, with particular virulence
80. See id. at 269 (noting the key issues in litigation involve the Land Dispute and
their effects on the traditional structure of Indian Country). Professor Cheyfitz
asserts that mediation failed, in large part, because Western-based oppositional
property law could not embody the concepts of traditional cultural collaboration
between the Navajo and the Hopi. Id.
81. See id. (noting that the 1990 census reported average per capita income of
$4,478 for Native Americans, compared to the national average of $14,420).
82. See A LBERT Y AVA , BIG F ALLING SNOW 137 (1978) (commenting on the disparate
interests of rich and poor Hopi families with regards to the contested land).
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83

since the Healing v. Jones decision in 1962, and that does not accord
with the imbricated ethnohistories, and the historical collaborative
84
practices of these two Indian communities. A practice generated by
this theory of collaboration would take the process out of the courts
and the colonial bureaucratic structure, including the mechanism of
85
tribal councils that officially governs Indian country.
Such a
practice would place the process within traditional Navajo and Hopi
86
Such
structures of mediation based in community consensus.
mediation between the Hopi Tribe, the Navajo Nation, and the HPL
Navajos, would, as a first step, need to acknowledge the collaborative
history, one of both comity and conflict, that has been displaced by
87
the reductive language of federal Indian law.

83. 210 F. Supp. 125 (D. Ariz. 1962).
84. See Cheyfitz, supra note 33, at 269-71 (asserting that the United States

Government, Peabody Coal and the tribal councils have prevented the possibility for
creative collaboration between the Navajo and the Hopi).
85. See id.
86. See id. (arguing that the prevailing notion of property interests over Indian
notions of communal land have had a destructive effect on the land dispute).
87. See id. (recognizing the need for resistance at the local level to address issues
of infrastructure).
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